Gadfly's Muse

Objection #2 to Theism: There is no squaring the amount of injustice and other evil in the world with the existence of an all good, all knowing, all powerful God.

1.    This is “de facto” in that it points toward the “fact” of evil, it is “de jure” in that it can be taken as logically inconsistent to believe in God in the face of such evil.

2.    Perhaps the objection was most forcefully stated by Epicurus ( c. 300 BC)
    a.    Is God willing to prevent evil, but not able? Then he is not omnipotent.
    b.    Is he able, but not willing? Then he is malevolent.
    c.    Is he both able, and willing? Then whence cometh evil?
    d.    Is he neither willing, nor able? Then why call him God?

3.    This should pretty much deflate any modern notions that the objections to Theism are part of our progress and enlightened state.  It is, literally, as old as the hills.

4.    Definitions: (the manner in which I am using terms, not necessarily precisely reflecting dictionary definitions but should be generally consistent with them)
    a.    Evil -  I take to mean the issues of suffering in its various forms whether directly related to man’s immediate actions and relationships or to the “natural” calamities that befall people.
    b.    Justice / Injustice - the moral assessment of consequences
        i.    “Just” is the label assigned to describe consequences that are deemed morally appropriate to some antecedent action or condition.
        ii.    “Unjust” is the label assigned to describe consequences that are deemed morally inappropriate to some antecedent action or condition.

5.    It is important to recognize that the entire shape of this objection is essentially ethical.
    a.    It is a question of the moral framework with which the world is viewed.
    b.    The “evidence” or “observed” data (datum?) is “There is evil in the world” (cf. The Book of Ecclesiastes) and this is “unjust”.
    c.    This is the force of your observation that there is no “squaring the amount of injustice...”
    d.    Therefore, as stated, the underlying assumption is that such notions as “just” and “unjust” are real and recognizable.

6.    The first answer to the objection that this condition is irreconcilable with the existence of an “all good” God is that the only way the objection can make sense is that there is such a thing as “good” and “evil”.
    a.    An example -                                    
        i.    in WWII the USS Indianapolis was sunk without being able to send a radio message
        ii.    Many of her crew (100's ?) spent several days floating on in the water waiting rescue
        iii.    Very quickly they were discovered by sharks and there was a condition of terror existing among the survivors for days... they were subjected to a feeding frenzy...

    b.    The point -
        i.    the assessment of whether or not this was an “evil” event depends entirely upon whether one views it from the framework of the survivors or from that of the sharks
        ii.    The sharks thought it was a positive good...

    c.    To speak of such things as “evil” or “unjust” is to assume that it is a positive “good” for humans to survive and sharks go hungry in such a situation.

7.    Therefore, before this objection can have merit, it must be demonstrated that the conditions in the world are in fact “evil” and “unjust”
    a.    To argue that such is the case - that evil and injustice are the conditions of the world - is either “subjective” or “objective”
    b.    If it is taken that it is “subjective” then it is to say that it is “evil” only from “man’s” perspective.
        i.    Given this perspective then it is logical to conclude that though it may be “evil” from man’s perspective it does not automatically follow that it is “evil” from God’s perspective
        ii.    The same condition applies to the notion of “good.”  Given that the idea of “good” is subjective, then it does not follow that the idea of “good” is the same for man and for God.
        iii.    Thus - if the notions of “good” and “evil” are taken as “subjective” then the objection is not precisely formulated - it should read - “There is no squaring of the amount of evil and injustice, AS PERCEIVED BY HUMANS, with the existence of an all-good, all-knowing God, AS THE NOTIONS OF GOOD AND EVIL ARE PERCEIVED BY HUMANS.

        iv.    This leads to the conclusion that it may very well be possible to “square” the existence of evil and injustice, AS PERCEIVED BY HUMANS, with the existence of an all-good, all-knowing God, AS THE NOTIONS OF GOOD AND EVIL ARE PERCEIVED BY GOD.

    c.    Thus, if we take the idea of good and evil as subjective, then the objection fails because there is no logical reason why the concepts of good and evil must be perceived in the same way by two entirely different categories of beings.

    d.    If it is taken that the notions of “injustice”, “evil” and “good” are objective
        i.    Then it is incumbent upon us to determine the measure by which the objective nature is established.
        ii.    For there to be an external objective measure of morality (see definitions above) there must exist an “Absolute”
        iii.    The condition of an “Absolute” is either “personal” or “impersonal”
        iv.    if it is assumed to be “impersonal”
            (1)    then it requires that this standard is subject to measurement and empirical validation and verification.
            (2)    the observation that there is “evil” and “injustice” in the world would only be valid if such a measurement can be taken and recognized...
            (3)    this accords to the human mind the status of alone, as far as we know, in all creation being capable of taking such a measurement.
            (4)    This position requires that human beings are thereby accorded a status above all other beings...
            (5)    this then makes it incumbent upon the one raising the objection to demonstrate why such is the case
                (a)    that humans are capable of discerning a universal, recognizable and demonstrable standard of good and evil
                (b)    that this standard when applied to the world demonstrates that the conditions of the objection are in fact present.

        v.    If it is assumed that the “Absolute” is “personal” then the objection actually presumes the idea of God, at least by extension.

8.    Thus, on both de jure (principles of logic) and de facto (the facts of the matter) this objection is disputed.
    a.    On what grounds can you establish that “evil” and “good” are in fact present
    b.    On what grounds can you establish that “evil” and “good” thus postulated are irreconcilable with the idea of an all-good, all-powerful God.

The Objection to Theism: There is no evidence to support Christian Theism over and against any other brand

1. First - caveats - I hold atheists to the same standard that they seek to hold me - that they understand the implications of their position.
2. The De Jure objection - Evidence for existence... a belief in on “theistic presupposition” is no more or less warranted than belief in any other.
a. Evidence - It is agreed that the fact of a Supreme Being cannot be conclusive established, nor given such evidential support from the facts of nature, that the evidence cannot be interpreted according to an atheistic perspective.
b. The idea of warrant -
i. Warrant for believing in a paradigm is not necessarily identical with the concept of evidence
ii. Evidence can provide warrant for believing, but warrant goes beyond evidence
iii. If evidence is inconclusive, one way or the other, as is the case with the physical, empirical facts of this universe, then warrant for believing one set of interpretations over another may legitimately be established from the relative value of the end toward which those interpretations tend.

iv. In other words, if one paradigm produces a “better” goal or other such end and does not deal with the evidence in any less a fashion than its opposite, then there is “warrant” for choosing that one over the other.

c. Though I am a Christian Theist, the place to start this discussion is not with Christian Theism vs. Atheism, but Theism vs. Atheism.
i. Christian Theism is warranted from within the Theist paradigm

ii. It is arrived at a posteriori not a priori

d. Therefore - the statement about whether or not one theistic presupposition (FSM or the Christian God) has any more evidence to support it than the other falls short of the basic question.

e. The correct question is - does the theistic assumption have any more or any less evidence to support it than the atheistic assumption. The answer is “no.”
i. Whatever arguments state that any one Theistic assumption is epistemologically equivalent to another applies equally to the Atheistic assumption.

ii. Hence you would have to admit that your FSM construct is just as much an argument against your atheist presupposition as it is the Christian Theist one.

f. Therefore - de jure - according to strict principles of logic - the argument as phrased is not an argument against the Theist position at all because it applies equally to the Atheist position.

g. However... it might be rephrased in this way...
i. There is no justification, no net advantage to believing in theism...
ii. Now we are no longer speaking of evidence but warrant for belief based on the qualitative distinctions between the two.

iii. Thus - de jure - one might say that it is irrational to adopt Theism because Atheism is so inherently superior in the advantages that it has over the Theistic position.

3. Summary - What I have maintained is that this  is not a valid objection.
b. It may very well be true that there is no physical evidence which supports or denies the existence of any theistic presupposition over another - hence, any supernatural  construct on the grounds of pure logic alone, could be advanced...
c. However, warrant for belief (de jure) is not tied exclusively to the idea of physical evidence, but rather extends to the logical implications of such a belief
d. The logical implications of a proposed supernatural construct would certainly be open to discussion as opposed to other Theistic and Atheistic presuppositions.
e. Further, an objection that one supernatural construct not being any more or less valid than other Theistic positions applies equally to the Atheistic position. So, unless one wishes to argue that neither Theism nor Atheism is de jure valid, then entire argument fails in the manner proposed.